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Abstract:
Risks that are associated with an uncertain trading world have been dealt with using two
different techniques in the literature: defensive, or insurance approaches, and preventive, or
self-protection approaches.  Much of the earlier work was emphasized by security issues but
with the end of the Cold War attention turned toward preventive approaches.  This paper
argues that the incentive for loss prevention leads to some form of cooperative regional
integration.  Inclusion of uncertainty positively contributes to the overall customs union
literature.   The optimal level of integration, political or economic, is found and then using
simple comparative statics, the effects of some changes in the underlying parameters of the
economy on the optimal level of integration are examined.  Multilateralism and regionalism
are concluded to be complements. 
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1 Introduction
The question of incentives for the formation of regional integration arrangements is a timely
one.  Nearly every country in the world is a member of, or in the process of discussing
membership in, one or more regional integration arrangements.  Currently, 144 countries are
members of the World Trade Organization (WTO); 150 regional trade agreements are in
force, most of which have been concluded within the last 10 years.  Agreements concluded
between developing countries account for 15% of the total.
1  This resurgence in regionalism
signifies some important changes in the relationship between the principal economic actors,
GATT/WTO as well as the increased advantage of regional cooperation.  
While the relative merits of joining such arrangements have been debated for some
time, the economic explanation for this recent proliferation remains unclear.  It is not at all
apparent that trade creation is an inevitable outcome of trade integration.
2  And, if that is the
case, then there must be an alternative explanation for the recent proliferation of regional
integration agreements (RIAs).  The standpoint of this paper is that the expansion of regional
integration stems from the increasing uncertainty associated with trade liberalization.
As the benefits of trade, specialization, and comparative advantage have increased, so
have the risks from trade and openness in the global economy.  Financial crises can no longer
be contained in one country but are more frequently spread to neighbors, and across the
globe.
3  Conflict interrupts trade, e.g., trade war over bananas can spread to other
commodities and severely damage regional well-being.  This paper argues that the incentive
for loss prevention takes the form of cooperation via regional integration.
The economics literature offers two ways to deal with activities associated with
uncertainty: defensive and preventive.  The defensive approach is associated with the
insurance literature; the preventive approach is associated with the self-protection literature. 3
The distinction between self-insurance and self-protection was first defined by Ehrlich and
Becker (1972).  Self-insurance expenditures can reduce the size of the loss while self-
protection expenditures can reduce the probability of suffering a loss.
4  A substantial portion
of the work dealing with uncertainty has been connected to security issues where the majority
use the  defensive approach by emphasizing loss minimization due to unexpected
occurrences.  The dominant strategy takes the form of stockpiling goods, subsidizing
domestic production, or some other variety of self-insurance. 
In an important contribution, Perroni and Whalley (2000) argued that regional trade
agreements (RTA) are sought by small countries in order to serve as ‘protection’ against a
global trade war, i.e., the possibility that an RTA acts as an insurance arrangement for the
small country.  Whalley (1998) also depicted RTAs as insurance arrangements because he
argued that smaller countries seek safe-haven agreements with larger trading partners to help
avoid being sideswiped by protectionist barriers imposed by the larger trading partners, even
those directed at other countries, e.g., U.S. against Japan or the European Union.  The above
arguments result in self-insurance arrangements (to lower the size of the loss) which mask the
possibility that a self-protection solution (to lower the probability of the loss) is what is
actually being sought.
With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the focus of security studies has shifted from
defensive to preventive.  McGuire (2000) integrated the classic security argument for
protection via tariff use with the alternative/complement of stockpiling.
5  However,
prevention has an older root in the literature.  Perhaps the earliest contribution using the
preventive approach dealt with customs unions.  This literature, by and large, has focused on
the static welfare gains, or losses, of the members versus those of the rest of the world. 
Within this context, the existence of the customs union is usually taken as a given; and only4
recently has the theoretical question of formation been included in this discussion.
6  Presently,
this literature has further expanded to include the examination of a more general motivation
for regional integration formation.  
This paper seeks to provide a general explanation for the proliferation of RIA’s by
proposing a model of self-protection, i.e., the prevention of loss.  This model unifies 
fundamentals from defense economics, the study of customs unions,  and expected utility
literatures.  The results are independent of RIA type and size.  
For example, the degree of regional integration is most shallow in Asia.  Traditionally
RIAs have been less popular yet both the Association of South East Asian Nations and APEC
have become much more active since the region’s recent bout of ‘Asian flu’.
7  The formation
of an Asian Free Trade Area no longer remains a remote possibility.  In Southern Africa, the
degree of integration is deeper.  States have sought more formal institutional mechanisms to
reduce the dependence of the region on South Africa through the creation of a development
community (SADCC); the ultimate goal is a customs union.  In Latin America,
experimentation with regional integration has included FTAs, Customs Unions, and now
Mercosur where Economic Union is the aspiration.
Europe has the longest tradition and the deepest level of regional integration.  There
are many historical examples of self-protection in the form of cooperative agreements.  Irwin
(1993) contends that the 1860 Anglo-French commercial treaty was influenced by the
possibility of war because of France’s opposition to Austria’s influence in Italy.
8  The
formation of the European Community also has its roots in the aim to “prevent war and
maintain peace.”  Trade and broader integration has created a European Union in which
Germany and France at war is an impossibility.5
The above examples illustrate how the degree of integration directly lowers the
probability of an unforeseen event.  The main finding of this paper is that countries do choose
to self-protect up to a certain point.  The strength of the multi-lateral trading system matters
and is linked to enforcement ability and institutional development.  Institutional development
is, however, indeterminate in this paper albeit the relative status of a hegemon is examined. 
A simple simulation shows that the level of integration cannot increase indefinitely; normally,
regionalism will  attain an optimal level.  
The paper is organized as follows: the theoretical framework and the optimal level of
regional integration is found in Section 2.  How changes in the underlying cost parameter
might affect the optimal level of integration is explored briefly in Section 3.  The main result
linking multilateralism and regionalism is discussed in Section 4.  Section 5 concludes.  
2 A Model of Optimal Integration 
In this paper, countries are treated as utility maximizers facing an uncertain outcome.  A
country faces the possibility of a “bad” event that may range from trade disruption to full
blown trade war, or it may be the non-occurrence of a “good” event.
9  These events are
generally influenced by a third more powerful country or organization, but this need not be
the case.  Obviously, nations concerned about actions by other countries, especially those
more powerful, will respond to any perceived uncertainty. 
The introduction of an expected utility model of uncertainty allows motives for
formation to be more adequately explained.  Contrary to the previous literature concerning
customs unions and free trade areas, size is not a consideration in this model.  There is also
no presumption that developed countries are not influenced by a self-protection incentive for
cooperation.  In addition, since the focus of this inquiry is to isolate the motivation of6
countries seeking to enter regional integration arrangements, the simplest model possible is
constructed to highlight the choice of integration.  
For  simplicity, there are two states in the uncertain world.   These two states are
labeled trade war (T), and no trade war (N).  A state of no trade war is strictly preferred to a
state of trade war and, therefore, utility is state dependent.  To reduce the impact of a trade
war, a country may take a variety of preventive actions in order to lower the probability of the
uncertain state, i.e., that of a trade war.  Taking preventive actions are akin to purchasing self-
protection.  
As stated, a country is an expected utility maximizer and utility is state dependent. 
Use of the state preference approach allows us to capture the fact that the country’s
preferences for goods and services depend on the state of nature under which they are
available.  The income constraints are thus different between the two states: trade war and no
trade war.
10  The degree of integration affects the probability of a trade war in a variety of
ways.  The probability of war decreases if: a more secured market increases regional
economies of scale; development of common institutions improves the quality of markets;
membership provides a dedicated market; trading clubs cut tariffs; and a most favored nation
status is assured.
The country wishes to change the probability of a trade war through some political or
economic integration, indexed by γ, where γ= (0,1].  Here cooperation is assumed to always
exist since zero levels of integration or cooperation imply autarky.  Figure 1 outlines the
basic characteristics of integration for the purposes of this paper.  Movement from one level
of integration to another will be referred to as a deepening of integration.  Note that  γ
captures the formation of a new RIA, whether between countries or between blocs, as well as7
the deepening of an existing RIA.   We are interested in obtaining the optimal level of
integration, γ*.
A cost is associated with integration.  Costs are assumed to be small for low levels of
integration and high for greater degrees of cooperation.  Because the development of
institutions serves to aid integration, the cost of cooperation also includes institutional
development costs, e.g., the costs of dismantling existing institutions in favor of new ones,
time costs of implementation, start-up costs of agreements, and so on.  These costs may be
considered purely monetary but one should not entirely ignore the possible non-pecuniary
political costs.
Let the cost associated with each level of integration be c(γ), where cN N N N(γ) > 0 and 
cO O O O(γ) > 0.  Thus, as integration increases, the costs increase at an increasing rate.  Let the
subjective probability of a trade war α(γ) be a function of γ, where αN N N N(γ) < 0 and αO O O O(γ) > 0. 
We assume that the probability of a trade war decreases as the level of integration increases,
and, that as the level of integration increases, the rate of change of the probability increases. 
In other words, the probability of a trade war abates slower with increasing integration.
Assume that a country produces and trades x, the numeraire good, and imports
another good, y.  Quantities of x in a trade war and no trade war will be different.  Let
domestically produced x in a state of trade war be labeled xT, and in a state of no trade war,
xN.  ym is the imported good and is traded at pw, the world price.  During a trade war, y is no
longer able to be imported and must be domestically produced so, let yD be the domestically
produced y in a trade war and pD, be its domestic price.    is the country’s resource x
endowment.  Changes in prices are assumed to completely reflect the transaction costs for
reallocation. 8
For simplicity, a specific utility function:  is employed,
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The share of consumption of the two goods in each state is represented by a Cobb-Douglas
function with 0< β <1 and 0< θ <1, where β is the share of x in a state of trade war and θ is
the share of x in a state of no trade war.  Because more of the imported good y will be
consumed during the state of no trade war, it is plausible to assume that the share of x
consumed during the state of no trade war is smaller than that during the state of trade war,
therefore, β>θ.  The world price of y is strictly greater than zero and is less than the domestic
price of y in a state of trade war.  
Given c(γ) and  α(γ), i.e., setting γ constant, and solving Equation (1) with respect to x
and y subject to the income constraints, we obtain a new maximization problem. 
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Solving the above maximization problem with respect to γ, we obtain the following first
order condition.
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where T, N, Β, and Θ are as above.  9
The first order condition yields an optimal γ*.
12  The left hand side of Equation (3) is
the marginal benefit of the activity γ, measured in the utility of the two states.  The right hand
side is the marginal cost weighted by the expected marginal utility of the two states.  A
country therefore chooses the optimal amount of integration where the marginal cost of
integration equals the benefits derived from decreasing the probability of the bad; that is, the
expected utility gain from a decrease in the probability of a bad outcome is equal to the
expected cost of achieving cooperation weighted by the expected marginal utility of the two
states.
Having found the optimal level of integration, I now turn to investigating how
changes in some of the underlying parameters of the economy might affect the optimal level. 
These parameters include: prices of goods, the country’s resource endowment, the country’s
risk aversion coefficient, institutional arrangements as well as the cost of integration and the
probability of a trade war.  Below, a change in the cost of integration is briefly examined. 
Section 4 presents the main result of this paper derived from investigating the impact of an
increase in the subjective probability of a trade war on the optimal level of integration.
3 The Cost of Integration 
Sectoral agreements incur costs of negotiation; they entail increased use of governing
institutions to monitor the agreement as well as the establishment of new institutions to aid in
tariff reduction or distribution.  This is especially true for the establishment of a customs
union.  Since a customs union entails a common external tariff, there must be an established
organization to govern transfer payments and distribution of the tariff income.  In many cases,10
e.g., the case of the previous East African Community, this proved to be very costly to
assume and often provides a source of contention for the participating countries.  
Consequently, as a country deepens its commitment to integration, the costs
associated with the establishment of increasingly powerful oversight institutions would rise. 
In addition to the monetary cost of integration, we would also expect an increase in non-
pecuniary institutional costs.  Specifically, as integration deepens, governments often incur
political costs associated with integration derived from loss of sovereignty over international
trading decisions.  With an increase in pecuniary and non-pecuniary institutional costs we
expect a country would exhibit less demand for integration.
Proposition 1: An increase in the institutional costs of integration will decrease the
level of self-protection through integration.
In order to examine the relationship between the cost of integration, an exogenous shift
parameter, τ is introduced.  Let the cost of integration now be represented by c(γ(τ); τ).  It is
now possible to examine how a change in the exogenous parameter will affect the optimal
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and S < 0 is the second order condition shown in the appendix.
Examining the above, it is easily shown that all three terms are negative.  The first
term represents the marginal benefit of integration activities in utility terms following a 
decrease in the probability of an unwanted event.  The second term is the marginal cost
weighted by expected marginal utility of the two states.  And, the third term is the marginal11
cost weighted by expected marginal utility with a squared term.  Since Z and S are both





underlying cost parameter of institutional costs, the optimal level of self-protection through
integration decreases.  This is consistent with intuition and, therefore, Proposition 1 holds.  
4 Multilateralism vs. Regionalism
The WTO regulates the trading relationships between states; its main function is to provide a
stable and predictable environment despite national policy differences within which trade and
investment can grow.  Regional integration arrangements (RIAs) have contributed to a more
rules based approach to trade relations.  They have done so by offering more effective
enforcement and compliance provisions than are available at the multilateral level.  RIAs can
facilitate multilateral agreements and thus enhance the market power of those countries
concerned.  They are GATT consistent and can coexist while promoting free trade and
complementing multilateralism.
The old regionalism of the 1960s was formed in the Cold War context.  The bipolarity
of the Cold War was reproduced within regions.  The new regionalism is taking shape in a
multipolar world.  Bhagwati (1996) has termed this the “new regionalism vs. old
regionalism.”  The decline of U.S. hegemony and the fall of the Berlin Wall has created a
vacuum in which the new regionalism developed. 
Gowa and Mansfield (1993) define bipolar coalitions as those which are the products
of system structure.  In a bipolar system, realignment is impossible since allies are firmly 
locked into their respective coalitions.  In contrast, a multipolar system is the result of choices
between several possible alternatives.  The assertion is that alliance stability can become12
problematic as each pole seeks to transfer the public good burden to the other.  Due to the
greater security of coalitions in the bipolar world, bilateral agreements are shown to have
stronger effects than those in a multipolar system. 
With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, the increase in
uncertainty regarding alliances and respective hegemons prompted the resurgence of a new 
regionalism.  Looking at Figure 2, it is apparent that a significant increase in RIAs has
occurred concomitant to a strengthening of the multilateral trading system.  The fall of the
Berlin Wall happens to coincide with the strongest multilateral agreements and the creation of
a supra-national institution governing dispute settlement in 1995. 
4.1 Multilateralism Defined 
There are several definitions of multilateralism.  Yarbrough and Yarbrough (1992) in their
exposition of a “strategic organizational model” applied to trade-policy institutions, propose
that at various time periods different trading institutions have dominated world trade.  Their
essential proposition is that institutional variety in trade liberalization reflects the efficacy of
alternate governance structures: unilateral, bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral.  They
define multilateralism as the process whereby countries solve problems in an interactive
cooperative fashion.
Yarbrough and Yarbrough model RIA formation as “minilateralism” where due to the
lack of a global hegemon, agreements are likely to be limited to smaller groups which then
create third party governance structures for dispute settlement.  However, multilateralism and
minilateralism, as they define them, are not exclusive of each other as claimed.  In reality,
WTO member countries do participate in bilateral, minilateral, as well as multilateral13
agreements.  Hence, empirically, the indications are that bilateralism, minilateralism, and
multilateralism do coexist.  
Winters (1999) proposes a more trade oriented definition.  He defines multilateralism
as a characteristic of the world economic system and the extent to which:
• Discrimination is absent, and 
• A country’s trading regime approximates free trade.  
This definition is also not immediately satisfactory as it is quite restrictive and does not take
into account the necessity for enforcement institutions.  Winters’ definition presumes some
degree of non-protectionist practices on the part of all individual countries.  
Mittaine and Pequerel (1999) define multilateralism as a system of trade organization
whereby the generalized trade preferences are extended to all partners adhering to
GATT/WTO.
13  This implies that they are not extended to those who are not members, i.e.,
Saudi Arabia.  This definition is also unsatisfactory in that non-members of GATT/WTO are
also beneficiaries of generalized trade preferences, particularly that of most favored nation
status.
Because trade has been shown by some researchers to be more open with a hegemon
than without, the relationship between hegemony and multilateralism cannot be overlooked. 
For the purposes of this paper, we require a definition of multilateralism which encompasses
not only the process of cooperative decision making and the need for a third party
enforcement mechanism provided through the global hegemon, but also the liberalization of
trade.  Therefore, we propose the following:
Definition:  Multilateralism requires the creation of a supra-national governance structure
which has the express purpose of influencing the global trading system to lower
discrimination and approximate free trade.14
4.2 Regionalism and the Supra-hegemon
The new resurgence of regionalism influences the nature and the evolution of the global 
economy.  Continued evolution will be accomplished through adequate measures to deal with
conflicts.  The need to reduce uncertainties underscores the importance of regime-building
enhancing predictability through rules.  Regionalism and multilateralism are inextricably
interlinked.
With the end of the Cold War, the hegemon role played by the U.S. declined.  The
decline in the influence of the hegemon, in time, encourages the growth of multilateralism. 
This growth reflects the nation’s desire for self-protection by purchasing cooperation through
regional integration in order to diminish the probability of a “bad” outcome.
The definition of multilateralism proposed in this paper presupposes that the WTO
has been able to competently assume its position as a supra-enforcement agent following the
decline in the power of the United States as the global hegemon.  There seems to be wide
agreement among policy analysts that the GATT/WTO rules are complied with by most
nations most of the time.  Due to its dispute resolution process, the capacity of the WTO to
prevent the occurrence of escalating and destabilizing conflicts has, in fact, proven itself to be
relatively forceful.  Available to all member states since 1995, it differs from the GATT 
mechanism in two important ways: panels have binding jurisdiction and the members are
obliged to submit to dispute resolution.  Panels write opinions which may be appealed to the
appellate body which acts largely as the judicial organ, thus encouraging the establishment of
a common law tradition. 
Stephan (2000) examines three cases of dispute resolution where the United States
lost.  He chooses the cases of environmental safeguards (dolphins and turtles), Kodak’s
complaint against Japan, and transfer pricing rules to show the significance of the way WTO15
organs justified their decisions.  The examples chosen by Stephan show that the WTO has
sufficient authority, and exercises it, to counter and even influence the actions of the United
States.  This alone indicates a decline in the hegemonic power of the United States.
14 
4.3 A Change in the Probability of a Trade War
Having shown the existence of multilateralism, let us now turn to examine a nation’s
propensity to join a RIA following an increase in the probability of a trade war.  To do so, we
repeat the strategy of introducing an exogenous shift parameter to α(γ).  Let η be such a shift
parameter and α(γ(η); η) is now the probability of a trade war.  Note that the parameter η can
also be interpreted as representing  the power of the supra-national institution, which is
inversely related to the decline of the United States as the global hegemon.  From Equation 3,
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and S < 0 is the second order condition.  The first term of H is the gain in utility following the
purchase of more self-protection in response to the change in the probability parameter, η. 
The second term is the marginal cost incurred by this increase weighted by the marginal
utilities of the two states.  The sign of the numerator is not immediately determinable,





Proposition 2: There exists a critical switching point beyond which self-protection
purchases will cease to increase with a greater threat of trade wars.
Clearly the urgency to join a multilateral trade organization depends on the initial probability
of a trade war following a decrease in the presence of a hegemon.  If α(γ(η); η) is large, there16
is every reason for a nation to require protection from multilateral trade organization.  In this
case, the gain in utility outweighs the marginal cost weighted term and integration would be
purchased. 
As the degree of participation increases and more protection is purchased, the
reduction in α alleviates this urgency.  Due to the presence of a wealth effect, the marginal
cost weighted term would overwhelm the gain in utility, consequently, the purchase of
integration would cease.  Thus said, there must exist an α below which an increase in η will
decrease the purchase of integration, γ
15. 
Owing to the fact that it is difficult to obtain an analytical solution for the switching
point, I present a simple simulation to demonstrate that such a switching point indeed exists.  
Figure 3 plots the relationship between alpha and gamma, and shows that their relationship is
non-monotonic.  The ‘switching point’ is reached when γ approximates 4.5 and the gain in
utility terms, due to the purchase of more self-protection in response to the change in the
probability parameter η, equals the marginal cost weighted by marginal utilities of the two
states.
16 
In other words, the switching point occurs when the power of the supra-national
organization, the WTO, has attained its maximum institutional strength, i.e., the WTO has
attained the ability to enforce its decisions and has developed a respectable history of
jurisprudence.  Consequently, countries will no longer perceive the need for self-protection
purchases against global trading risks.  Under the circumstances, Proposition 2 implies that
multilateralism and regionalism are indeed complementary to each other.17
5 Conclusion
The post-World War II trading regime has seen a shift from the use of protective
policy to the use of other forms of trade restrictions.  Although the GATT/WTO has sought to
build a stable environment for trade policy subject to simple and predictable rules,
governments have chosen to intervene more closely in international markets using non-tariff
controls and tariffs tailor-made to the perceived need of protected domestic industries.  The
Bretton Woods institutions were, in part, developed to facilitate cooperation between the
economic powers and to prevent world economic crises from developing anew.  However,
since the Second World War, a large number of bilateral disputes have surfaced and on a
number of occasions, disputes involving the great economic powers have sometimes begun to
evolve into intensive trade wars. 
A paradoxical effect of the Cold War was the emergence, with U.S. support, of a set
of international organizations undertaking types of economic coordination to supersede the
state-to-state management of issues of international influence.
17  The fall of the Berlin Wall
has dramatically changed the global system of alliances and has altered the U.S.’s influence. 
More significant is the emergence of the WTO which provided trade agreements with the
institutional provision of third party enforcement.
The relatively recent shift of study from the defensive approach, associated with
insurance, to preventive, associated with self-protection, in the economics literature has not
generally addressed issues outside those of the security arena.  This paper has used the self-
protection framework to analyze and provide a general explanation of regional integration
where the incentive for loss prevention takes the form of cooperation.  Through the formation
of political and economic agreements, the probability of the uncertain outcome is reduced. 18
Clearly, international regional integration is a complex phenomenon incorporating
many different degrees of integration with an equally diverse number of aims and objectives. 
The problem does not readily lend itself to simplification.  This paper proposes a model
which uses elements from three literatures - on customs unions, on preventive action, and
security issues - to fill a gap in the theory of economic integration.  In particular, it has
extended the self-protection literature to incorporate cooperative aspects. 
In this paper, I have treated countries as utility maximizers faced with two states in the
uncertain world: trade war and no trade war.  A country chooses some level of integration to
which a cost is associated.  I find the optimal level of integration and then explore how
changes in the underlying cost and probability parameters affect the optimum.  
An increase in the institutional cost of self-protection results in a decreasing interest
on the part of the country to purchase integration.  Both changes in institutional cost and in
multilateralism are institutional arrangements which affect the country’s desire for
integration.  In particular, I find that as the power of the bipolar system declines, interest in
self-protection increases.  This heightened interest is due to the fact that countries are no
longer locked securely into the Cold War alliances as the probability of a bad state increases.  
This paper has shown that it is the resulting uncertainty which encourages the formation of
regional integration arrangements. 19
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3. Kreinin (1964) and others have argued that one of the incentives for the formation of a RIA
is the elimination of risks and uncertainty from foreign transactions leading to expanded trade
and investments.
4. In a subsequent analysis, Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1985) examined the effects of risk
aversion on self-protection and self-insurance activities.  They found that a more risk averse
individual is not necessarily inclined to purchase more self-protection.
5. The optimal mix of protection and stockpiling depends on cost parameters while lower risk
aversion entails stronger preparation and increased importance for stockpiling.
6. These formations can also be modeled in a bargaining framework.  See for example,
Reizman, R., 1979.  A 3x3 Model of Customs Unions.  Journal of International Economics
9:341-354.
7. If APEC is counted as a type of planned regional trading arrangement, then all countries in
the WTO now belong to at least one club.  Since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, there has
been a commencement of FTA negotiations intra-APEC.  These negotiations include
countries who have hitherto been opposed to such types of agreements, i.e., Japan.  In
response to the financial crisis, the core ASEAN countries have accelerated regional
economic integration and moved the target year forward dropping tariffs beginning in 2002. 
In addition, the ASEAN FTA has now targeted 2008 as the scheduled date for
implementation of the zero tariff trade zone.  
8. Domestic political and economic factors were not aligned with the possibility of such an
agreement.  “Both governments saw a commercial treaty as a way of defusing tensions and
improving diplomatic relations.”  Britain ensured its political relationship with France,
benefitted greatly from new lower tariff rates, and diminished the probability of war. 
9. China not being accepted to the WTO.  An expected treaty not being signed e.g. an
expected Arab-Israeli peace treaty not being ratified by the Knesset.
10. The utility function may differ between trade war and no trade war. Some goods may
simply be more valued in a state of trade war; the state dependence of the utility function
allows this concept to be captured. 
11. See Appendix for the general case.
12. The second order condition is reported in the Appendix.
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14. A cursory review of the Appellate Body and panel opinions indicates a concerted effort to
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distinct matters which resulted in 93 panels formed; of these, 19 are pending, 40 were settled
before panel resolution and 34 were withdrawn or settled by other means.  As of early 2002,
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15. McGuire, Pratt, Zeckhauser (1991) found the existence of a critical switching probability. 
They consider the proposition that “the more risk-averse individual pays less to secure a small
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reducing small changes of bad outcomes.”  They come very close to identifying the explicit
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16. In preliminary simulation results, the switching point is when gamma is close to 4.5.  This
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Figure 3: The Probability of a Trade War and RIA Formation 
Note: γ calculated for α=(0,1) and assumed to be a quadratic function. 
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Appendix
1 A General Function
γ is the level of formal trade integration (0,1], i.e., the level of self-protection chosen by the
home country.  α(γ) = [0,1]  is the probability of a trade war where αN N N N(γ) < 0 and αO O O O(γ) > 0. 
c(γ) is the cost associated with integrating and cN N N N(γ) > 0 and cO O O O(γ) > 0.  xD is the domestically
produced good and is the numeraire. ym is the imported good and is traded at the world price,
pw.  During wartime, yD, no longer able to be imported, must be domestically produced, and is
purchased at the domestically determined price pD.  
Expected utility is:
(1.1) EU x y U x y TTD NNM () ( ) ( , ) ( ( ) ) ( , ) ⋅= + − αγ αγ 1
In this case, not only does the utility function depend on the state of the world, but so does the
constraint.   is the country’s endowment.  The consumer purchases integration for c(γ) in x
the following manner:  
InStateof TradeWar p x p y x c









The problem facing the consumer is to choose the vector of commodities, X = (x,y), and γ
such that the expected utility is maximized subject to the appropriate constraint.  It is
intuitively appealing to view this problem in two stages: First, to maximize X conditional
upon α, given some γ; Second, to choose γ using the information derived from the first stage.  
Let x be the numeraire, then constraint in the state of trade war becomes:
xc x p y TD D −= ⋅ + () γ 1
Solving  the conventional consumer choice problem with x as the numeraire good, the
constraint in the state of no trade war becomes:
     xc x p y Nw m −= ⋅ + () γ 1
Assuming that the second order conditions of the above utility functions are satisfied (shown
below), it is possible to solve these first order conditions for a set of functions of the form:
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 In the second stage, the problem is to choose the optimal level of integration, γ*, in order to
maximize expected utility.  By substitution into the utility functions of the expected utility
problem, we yield the following in indirect utility terms:
EU F p x c U G p x c TD Nw ( ) ( ) [ (( , ), ( ))] ( ( )) [ (( , ), ( ))]
** o =− + − − αγ γ αγ γ 11 1
Note that the levels of x and y are optimized under constraints for each state separately. 
Therefore the level of x consumed in a state of trade war does not equal the level of x
consumed in a state of no trade war.
(1.2) {} Max E Max U
T
Fp x c U
N
Gp x c Dw γγ αγ γ αγ γ () ( ) [ (( , ), ( ))] ( ( )) [ (( , ), ( ))]
** ⋅= − + − − 11 1
where pD*and pw* are the equilibrium prices for those quantities of x and y in trade war and
no trade war, respectively, and F and G are as described above.  Solving the above
maximization problem with respect to γ, gives the following first order condition.
(1.3) [] [ ] ′ −= ′′ +− ′′ ⋅ ′ αγ α γ α γ γ () () ( () ) () UU U F U G c TN T N 1
The first order condition yields an optimal γ*.  The left hand side of Equation (1.3) is the
marginal benefit of the activity γ, measured in the utility of the two states.  The right hand
side is the marginal cost weighted by the expected marginal utility of the two states. 
1.2 Second Order Condition
Differentiating (1.3) with respect to γ yields the following expression.
Solving for the second order conditions with respect to γ, we get the following:
SU U U F U G c
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where F2 and G2 indicate that the derivative is taken with respect to the second term. 
Examining the first line of the second order condition, we see similarities with the first order
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The first term (1.3a) is positive.  αN(γ) dominates αO(γ) as the rate of change in the probability












The last term (1.3c) is negative.  The middle term (1.3b) is also negative and is subtracted.  In
order to satisfy the second order condition, it can be shown that |1.3b+1.3c|>|1.3a| is satisfied.
2  A Specific Function
(1)
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Using the following substitutions:
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the first order condition is:
(3) () () ′ − − − 
 

  = ′ − − 
  








αγ γ α γ α γ () () () ( () ) e RT e RN ce RT Re RN R ΒΘ 1
The value of γ which satisfies the first order condition is γ
*.  As before, the expected utility
gain from a decrease in the probability of a trade war is equal to the expected marginal utility
weighted by the expected cost of cooperation.
Solving this equation for the value of the cost which coincides with the optimal γ
*, we arrive
at the following expression for the cost of integrating.
(3a) []
















αγ αγ ΒΘ 1
Next, we verify the second order condition.
(3b)
() () []
() () () () ()







































Examining the second order condition, it can be shown that the first term is positive.  The
second term is positive but subtracted and the third term is negative.  These are as in the
general case.  In order to satisfy the second order condition, the second plus third terms must
be constrained to be greater, in magnitude, than the first term.2008
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